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Cooperation & Conflict  
in the Patriarchal Labyrinth
Nancy Folbre
This essay offers a new way of visualizing structures of collective power based on 
gender, emphasizing the role of social institutions in shaping women’s ability to bar-
gain over the distribution of the gains from cooperation with men. It makes the case 
for an interdisciplinary conceptualization of bargaining power that emphasizes the 
role of imperfect information and inefficient outcomes, and explains important 
parallels between structures of collective power based on gender, age, and sexuality,  
and those based on other dimensions of socially assigned group membership such as 
race, ethnicity, citizenship, and class. Recognition of the importance of reproduc-
tive work helps advance the project of developing intersectional political economy.  
Consider the term “power structure.” Social scientists often refer to hierar-chical structures, sets of institutions, or economic arrangements that frame the environment in which people live and work. Both power and hierarchy 
imply a structure of pyramidal shape, with big groups at the bottom and small 
groups at the top. Yet the implied pyramids tend to be simple and two-dimension-
al drawings on a page. Their internal spaces as well as their relationships to one an-
other remain largely unspecified, making it difficult to understand how people op-
erate within them. In this essay, I develop a more complex visual metaphor: three- 
dimensional pyramids of power with internal paths that allow some opportuni-
ty for those within them to climb upward but put greater obstacles in the way of 
others. 
A patriarchal labyrinth describes risks and hurdles that vary by gender, age, and 
sexuality. It helps explain why, as psychologists Alice Eagly and Linda Carli have put 
it, “women’s paths to power remain difficult to traverse.”1 Such institutional struc-
tures vary considerably over time and space and are vulnerable to renegotiation and 
redesign. They typically overlay and intersect other labyrinthine hierarchies based 
on different dimensions of group inequality. Together, they create complex strate-
gic environments in which both women and men try to defend or advance their po-
sition and, sometimes, to modify the institutional environment in their favor. Such 
efforts, however, are hampered by the unpredictability of the labyrinth itself and 
the shifting alliances that affect the success of collective efforts to traverse it. 
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This visual image illustrates the ways in which patriarchal institutions con-
strain the choices that women make, reducing their ability to negotiate obstacles. 
The word “negotiate” is key here, because progress toward power and econom-
ic security is not like some athletic contest in which outcomes are determined in 
large part by individual prowess, like slogging through mud or climbing a rope. 
Rather, it is a team sport in which individual performance matters, but team or 
group membership shapes bargaining power: the ability to influence the rules 
and outcomes of the game. Progress upward in the labyrinth requires coopera-
tion with others, but the gains from cooperation are often unequally distributed. 
Women are assigned greater responsibilities for the creation and maintenance of 
human capabilities than men are, and these responsibilities tend to reduce their 
bargaining power. The path to gender equality requires the development of new 
institutions to ensure more equitable sharing of the costs of caring for dependents. 
This theoretical argument contends that global gains in women’s legal rights 
over the last century have weakened but not demolished patriarchal institutional 
structures. Combining institutional analysis with bargaining logic, I explain how 
any group that is able to claim a disproportionate share of the gains from cooper-
ation can develop social institutions to fortify their position. The balance of gen-
dered power can shift for a variety of reasons, including changes in the division of 
labor wrought by economic development and change. However, structures of pa-
triarchal power are reinforced by their intersections and overlaps with other laby-
rinthine hierarchies based on race, citizenship, and class.  
A symmetry in human rights represents asymmetry in paths to economic equality. Recent feminist discourse has successfully expanded a basic hu-man rights framework to insist on its application to the realms of gen-
der, the family, and sexuality.2 This is no mean feat and it merits great appreci-
ation. Research published by multilateral institutions such as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have 
helped expose laws and public policies that are inconsistent with liberal princi-
ples of equal opportunity.3 In the more academic realm, sociologist Goran Ther-
born has exhaustively documented the global retreat of patriarchal law (acknowl-
edging that some enclaves remain almost untouched).4
Even from the vantage point of the United States and other affluent countries, 
however, this celebration seems premature. While women have long enjoyed legal 
rights largely commensurate with those of men, they remain economically and 
politically disadvantaged. Empirical research shows that women earn consider-
ably less than men largely because they take more responsibility for the care of 
children and other dependents, incurring “motherhood penalties.”5 Women also 
remain concentrated in occupations and industries that provide care services, of-
ten incurring “care penalties” as a result.6 
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Some such research implies that women simply have different preferences 
than men do, choosing to sacrifice earnings in return for the emotional rewards 
of care.7 Many feminist scholars, however, advocate a more structural view, not-
ing that individual preferences are shaped by social norms and economic circum-
stances that are, in turn, shaped by political and economic power.8 Some invoke 
patriarchy, or capitalism, or patriarchal capitalism; others point to complex forms 
of intersectional power.9 I believe that these approaches can be effectively synthe-
sized by more attention to specific institutional structures that both reflect and 
advance collective interests.10  
T he vast literature on social institutions offers many important but diffuse insights. Institutions can be categorized in a variety of ways, according to sites (such as state, market, and family), functions (such as production, 
distribution, and socialization), and social science domains (such as political, eco-
nomic, and cultural, corresponding roughly to legal governance, resource alloca-
tions, and cultural norms). All of these categorizations can serve useful purposes. 
However, emphasis on collective conflict leads me to categorize institutional 
structures in terms of their distributional consequences: sets of institutions that 
shape access to gains from cooperation in unequal ways based on some dimen-
sion of socially assigned group identity, such as gender, sexual orientation, age, 
class, race, ethnicity, or citizenship. Rather than attributing gender inequality to a 
unique set of institutions and class inequality or race inequality to another unique 
set, I allow for the possibility that many types of institutions can separately or col-
lectively reinforce many dimensions of group inequality. 
Both obstacles and shortcuts in paths upward toward greater relative power 
and economic security can be labeled according to the way they filter and redi-
rect members of specific groups, even though they can affect more than one group 
at a time. The important questions are who benefits, how, and how much? This 
approach departs from mainstream economic theory, which interprets social in-
stitutions as efficient solutions to coordination problems that cannot be easily 
resolved by decentralized individual choices (that is, markets).11 Distributional 
conflict fades into the background.12 Efficiency also implies transparency, or at 
least sufficient light in the corridors to be able to see the best path upward.
Some political scientists offer a more nuanced explanation of institutions, 
pointing to the impact of both distributional conflict and political power.13 Yet 
here, too, capacities for rational choice and cost-benefit analysis are often taken 
for granted. Popular game-theoretic models stipulate payoff matrices and/or fall-
back positions in advance, as though all the players clearly see the consequences 
of their actions. In a labyrinth, by contrast, players may be quite rational but none-
theless quite vulnerable to taking wrong turns; the possible paths are confusing 
and official signposts misleading. The resulting uncertainty reinforces a tenden-
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cy to minimize risk and conform to precedent even when this does not lead to the 
best possible outcome. 
The social institutions that constitute hierarchical structures reflect multilay-
ered processes of bargaining over the level and distribution of gains from cooper-
ation. Naming such structures by their distributional outcomes–who they most 
benefit–links the burgeoning literature on patriarchal institutions to structural 
concepts such as patriarchy, capitalism, racism, and nationalism. Yet it challeng-
es the notion that such structures are independent or autonomous, defining them 
instead as structures of collective power constituted by social institutions: a jag-
ged mountain range of hierarchical labyrinths.
Efforts to follow a convoluted path or climb an economic ladder are obvi-ously affected by legal and political rights. However, they are also affect-ed by social obligations. For instance, those who bear the burdens of fi-
nancial support and direct care of dependents often find it difficult to compete 
with those who are unencumbered. Tensions between gender equality and recog-
nition of gender difference–a manifestation of tensions between rights and ob-
ligations–are deeply embedded in the history of feminist activism in the United 
States, reflecting the complementary but distinct priorities of liberal and social-
ist feminisms. 
Legal restrictions on women’s rights leave a particularly clear historical trail, 
offering an evidentiary advantage over research on other types of institutions. 
Yet the distribution of social obligations is equally important. Even when wom-
en freely choose to devote more time and energy to the care of others than men 
do, they do not choose the economic consequences. Both patriarchal and capital-
ist institutional structures enable people in general and men in particular to free 
ride on caregivers. 
Capitalist employers do not reward activities that do not generate a prof-
it, whatever the public or social benefits such activities create. Within capitalist 
structures of collective power, those who devote less time and effort to unprof-
itable activities than others have commensurately greater access to earnings and 
wealth. This asymmetry means that partnerships with men offer women impor- 
tant economic benefits, even when these partnerships render them vulnerable to 
the threatened withdrawal of support. Economic dependence reduces women’s 
ability to bargain over the distribution of care responsibilities in the home, the 
workplace, and the polity. It also reduces their ability to defy or modify patriar-
chal norms. 
While patriarchal institutional structures have disempowered women, they 
have also imposed significant forms of social obligation on men. In many tradition-
al patriarchal societies, strong community sanctions and informal rules–if not al-
ways specific laws–required that a man provide support for a woman he impregnat-
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ed and take economic responsibility for his offspring. Likewise, support for aging 
parents, including widows, was often effectively enforced. As women have gained 
new rights, however, men have often offloaded some of their responsibilities. The 
breakdown of the “shotgun marriage” rule in the United States, for instance, con-
tributed to an increase in the percentage of families maintained by women alone.14 
The expansion of women’s access to paid employment has often been accom-
panied by poor specification of women’s rights to remuneration for family care 
from their children’s fathers, their adult children, and more broadly, from the 
state. Increased family instability offers women more scope for individual choice, 
but less reliable networks of support. The distribution of income and leisure with-
in married couples often benefits men, but co-residence typically guarantees some 
commonality in living standards. Nonmarriage, separation, divorce, and long- 
distance migration in search of individual employment tend to reduce family in-
come pooling, particularly costly to mothers of young children. 
Access to market income sometimes comes at the expense of intrafamily trans-
fers, which remain poorly measured and largely ignored by most standard mea-
sures of family welfare. The tally of patriarchal laws that have been–or need to 
be–stricken from the books should be accompanied by a list of new laws needed 
to encourage more equal distribution of the costs of caring for dependents and in-
vesting in the development of human capabilities.  
T he labyrinth metaphor leaves ample room for the role of individual and group agency: All enter the structure at different starting points, some more advantageous than others. Still, effort, skill, and teamwork affect 
their probability of avoiding the hazards and reaching the prizes within. Every-
one may engage in efforts to clear their own path, or to close paths to others. The 
set of choices that individual and collective agents face, however, is far more com-
plex than that implied by economic models of utility maximization that assumes 
perfect information, exogenously given preferences, and sovereign self-interest. 
Individual agents are, from the outset, socially assigned to groups. As children 
they cannot choose their gender, age, sexual orientation, class background, race 
and ethnicity, citizenship, or a host of other collective identities that influence the 
preferences they form and the capabilities they develop as well as the opportuni-
ties available. As they mature, agents gain scope for self-awareness and rational 
choice, and their most important choices concern the strength of allegiances to 
the various groups to which they are assigned, which may be a source of intrinsic 
satisfaction as well as a determinant of their future economic success. The conse-
quences of such choices, however, will always remain uncertain, because they are 
affected by the simultaneous choices of others. 
In other words, the scope for rational decisions by individuals is limited not 
only by the constraints imposed by institutional structures, but also by the dif-
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ficulty of coordinating enforceable decisions with other independent agents or 
forming stable alliances with them. This latter difficulty helps explain why insti-
tutional labyrinths are resistant to change: even the most disadvantaged partic-
ipants derive some benefit from them if the only alternative is to exit to an even 
more dangerous, unpredictable, and unstructured environment. Nonetheless, the 
threat of an exit by the disadvantaged remains significant, exercising some influ-
ence on the actions of those who benefit from their cooperation. 
T he concept of cooperative conflict plays a central role in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and has been applied persuasively to gender bargaining in households by economist Amartya Sen and others.15 Distinct groups or 
individuals may have much to gain from cooperation with one another, but none-
theless struggle over the distribution of the gains from cooperation. Philosopher 
Charles Mills has correctly observed that the term “cooperative conflict,” ap-
plied, for instance, to institutions such as slavery, is far too benign.16 As Catharine 
MacKinnon has pointed out in her discerning critique of the concept of “consent” 
to sex, hierarchical institutional structures can lead to something that could be 
more aptly described as coerced cooperation.17 What we call “freedom” depends 
largely on the existence of viable alternatives to subordination. 
Within the economics discipline, attention to bargaining between men and 
women within households has now largely displaced microeconomic models that 
treat the household itself as a unitary decision-maker. Yet most bargaining mod-
els retain a focus on individuals operating in a social environment that is taken as 
a given, ignoring the incentives for joint efforts to challenge or to reinforce polit-
ical, cultural, and economic institutions. A broader approach to bargaining that 
brings collective identity and action into the picture helps explain how it both 
shapes and is shaped by hierarchical structures. The complexities of bargaining in 
a dark labyrinthine environment also deserve explicit consideration.  
Cooperation can take many different forms, ranging from agreement to par-ticipation in a market exchange to willingness to follow orders. The distri-bution of the gains from cooperation is not determined by each person’s 
“value added,” but by their fallback position: what happens to them if cooper-
ation breaks down. A credible threat of physical violence weakens fallbacks, as 
does lack of independent access to income or withdrawal of economic support for 
the care of dependents. 
One of the early pioneers of household bargaining models, Marjorie Mc- 
Elroy, has observed that social institutions, or what she calls “extra-environmen-
tal household parameters,” could affect the fallback position of household mem-
bers.18 For instance, divorce law, access to public assistance, and cultural norms 
influence the relative consequences of marital dissolution for husbands and 
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wives. Building on McElroy’s observation, I have suggested a different nomencla-
ture: “gender-specific environmental parameters.”19 
Empirical research substantiates this important linkage between social insti-
tutions and microeconomic outcomes. For instance, economists Shelly Lundberg 
and Robert Pollak have shown that a policy innovation in the United Kingdom 
that directed child allowances to mothers rather than fathers altered the alloca-
tion of household spending.20 Applying a qualitative, rather than quantitative ap-
proach, economist Bina Agarwal has persuasively explained the impact of cultural 
norms on household bargaining outcomes in developed countries.21
Legal institutions have particularly clear implications for household bargain-
ing. Until well into the twentieth century, for instance, U.S. law obligated a hus-
band to meet the subsistence needs of his wife and children, but not to share fam-
ily income equally with them.22 Today, family law in the United States enforc-
es a responsibility for the mutual support of spouses, but does not require equal 
sharing (though in some states, community property laws dictate equal sharing 
of wealth acquired during marriage in the event of divorce). In many countries, 
men historically enjoyed the right to physically abuse their wives, as long as they 
caused no lasting injury. Even after these rules were reformed, protection against 
domestic violence within marriage remained largely ineffective until quite late in 
the twentieth century. 
The threat of physical abuse of some women by some men exerts a disciplinary 
influence on all women, making them more appreciative of (and dependent on) 
nonabusive men. Likewise, the extreme physical abuse of many slaves in the 
American South, however costly to their owners, created an implicit threat that 
represented a kind of social externality for slaveowners who were less abusive, al-
lowing them to don a mantle of benevolence. In both cases, members of powerful 
groups have an incentive to avert their eyes from abuses of power that they would 
never directly perpetrate. 
Bargaining can, and often does, take more subtle forms. Fallback positions are 
not limited to exit options. Individuals who believe they are being treated unfairly 
are particularly likely to shirk or engage in sabotage, reducing the gains from co-
operation in ways particularly costly to those who benefit the most from them. In 
the context of household bargaining, this strategy can be labeled “burnt toast.” 
The extensive literature on efficiency wages in capitalist firms explains why em-
ployers may benefit from paying a higher-than-market clearing wage: the result-
ing cost of job loss creates an incentive for workers whose performance is difficult 
or costly to monitor to increase their effort.23 Similarly, a man may offer a wom-
an a higher-than-necessary share of the gains from cooperation, because this in-
creases her effort in or fealty to the partnership. Altruistic sentiments and person-
al affections also soften bargaining. What economists refer to as “gift exchange” 
between some employers and their workers is far more likely to take place with-
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in households than within capitalist firms.24 Yet it cannot always be relied upon. 
Women’s vulnerability to inequality within households governed by patriarchal 
rules results in part from the fragile quality of emotional attachments.  
T he effects of social institutions on household bargaining have been more thoroughly explored than the causal arrows that run the other direction, because these are more difficult to pin down. Yet the links between the 
micro- and macrolevels are obvious: if patriarchal institutions affect the relative 
bargaining position of men and women within households, then men and wom-
en have incentives to engage in collective efforts to modify those institutions in 
their favor. 
This approach subsumes both the neoclassically influenced concept of rent- 
seeking and the Marxian theory of class conflict under a larger rubric.25 Group 
success often leads to the consolidation of institutional power, which can, in turn, 
increase a group’s share of gains from cooperation. A person or group in an initial-
ly strong fallback position can capture a large share of the gains, then invest those 
gains in efforts to improve their fallback position or weaken the fallback position 
of others. Once a group occupies the top of a hierarchical institutional structure, 
they can use their leverage to develop political, economic, and cultural institu-
tions that preserve their advantage. 
This dynamic helps explain a dialectic between power and efficiency that con-
tributes to the persistence of social institutions that are inefficient as well as un-
fair. Sometimes, innovations that could increase the size of the “social pie” are 
blocked because they might reduce the share of powerful groups. A big slice of a 
small pie can be more desirable than a much smaller piece of a slightly larger pie. 
Capitalist development sometimes delivers opportunities for women to earn 
wages outside the home that can potentially yield greater benefits to their house-
holds than their nonmarket work. However, husbands may be reluctant to let 
them take advantage of such opportunities because the potential reduction in 
their share of the total benefits may outweigh increases in the overall size of those 
benefits.26 Similar reasoning explains why slaveholders in the United States pro-
hibited the education of slaves, even though such education could have improved 
the productivity of the slave-based economy. In both of these examples, the struc-
ture of collective power impedes institutional changes that could potentially in-
crease efficiency. 
Emphasis on individual and collective bargaining does not imply rational choices informed by systematic cost-benefit analysis. There are no round oak tables in hierarchical labyrinths at which agents sit down to make of-
fers and counteroffers. Still, most forms of collaboration are influenced to some 
degree by implicit bargaining. As advertisements for a prominent business train-
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ing consultant put it, “You don’t get what you deserve. You get what you nego-
tiate.”27 Threats and promises, fakes and feints, persuasion and coercion, coali-
tion and compromise often take implicit forms. Even market exchange is often 
contested.28 Process may matter as much as payoffs: some people are trained to 
bargain harder than others. Payoffs are seldom perfectly clear and may often be 
misperceived or unknown (what military strategists refer to the “fog of war” also 
applies to the cloud of sex). 
Explicit bargaining is not only costly and time-consuming, it can also create re-
sentment and ill will. Economists typically assume that married partners will not 
try to block any move that improves their partner’s outcome, as long as it comes 
at no cost to them.29 In the real world, however, spite often trumps reason, invites 
retaliation, and leaves both bargainers worse off than they were before. Some men 
kill their partners, then commit suicide. 
Social norms can lubricate cooperation by offering implicit rules, and some-
times explicit solutions, to costly forms of disagreement. How best to divide a 
pie? “You slice, and I’ll choose.” Want to avoid a fight? “Let’s flip a coin.” If a hus-
band and wife cannot agree on how to divide tasks they may simply fall back to so-
cial expectations.30 Yet social expectations tend to favor those in already favored 
positions.31 Norms of appropriate femininity can reinforce gender inequality, just 
as patriotic norms can justify aggression against countries, racial pride can fuel 
White supremacy, and elitist values can legitimate class disparities. 
Altruistic norms are often internalized in ways that affect individual prefer-
ences and perceptions. If one bargainer cares more about the other (or about third 
parties who may be affected), bargaining outcomes will be skewed in favor of the 
less altruistic or more assertive member, as suggested by the phrase “nice guys 
(and nice gals) finish last.” In a generalization of the “hidden injuries” of class, the 
subordination of women weakens their individual and group agency.32 Hetero- 
normative values as well as homophobic attitudes can undermine the confidence 
of those labeled deviant. Oppression itself is often internalized.33  
Cooperative processes in which individuals cannot necessarily identify or claim their own value added characterize many aspects of economic life, but play a particularly important role in processes of reproduction (defined 
here as the creation and maintenance of human capabilities) and social reproduc-
tion (defined here as the creation and maintenance of social groups). Since wom-
en devote relatively more time and energy to these tasks than men do, this makes 
institutional bargaining particularly relevant to the analysis of gender inequality. 
The specific demands of reproduction have direct implications for the bargain-
ing power of those who specialize in it. Responsibility for the care of dependents 
often renders women dependent on men to meet their own subsistence needs. 
The emotional attachment to others that is intrinsic to caregiving also weakens 
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fallback positions.34 As a result, declining specialization in reproductive tasks has 
contributed to women’s empowerment. Two very long-run historical trends–
fertility decline and technological changes favoring intellectual capabilities over 
physical strength–have increased women’s collective bargaining power. Yet in-
stitutional resistance to gender equality remains significant, in part because such 
equality requires a redistribution of the costs of caring for others.  
R eproduction creates and maintains human capabilities of enormous eco-nomic value. Care for children is sometimes referred to as investment, and care for the seriously disabled and elderly as consumption, because 
it is unlikely to generate future economic gains. In standard capital accounting, 
however, investment covers the costs of depreciation. Both financial support and 
direct care for the sick and elderly, like that devoted to children, should be consid-
ered a form of social investment. Their important insurance function should also 
be recognized: productive workers are more willing to support dependents when 
they anticipate reciprocal assistance when they become dependent themselves. 
Care providers, however, are seldom able to capture fully a share of the social 
value they create. Whether unpaid or paid, their contributions are difficult to stan-
dardize. Care work typically requires collaboration with others, including family 
members and other care providers. It often requires cooperation from care recipi-
ents themselves: children must heed their parents, patients must follow their doc-
tors’ orders, and students must do their homework. The quality of care services 
often hinges on concern for the well-being of the care recipient. All of these char-
acteristics limit the bargaining power of caregivers. Men, as well as women, can 
become “prisoners of love,” but cultural norms make it easier for men to escape: 
fathers can ignore or abandon children in part because of their confidence that 
mothers will fill the breach; adult sons are more likely to provide direct care for 
their elderly parents if they lack a sister. Gender norms often make women depen-
dent on other women, such as their own mothers or their daughters, for signifi-
cant assistance with care; not surprisingly, this dependency can make them fear-
ful of change (if women began to act as “carelessly” as men, what would happen 
to families?). 
M any trends associated with processes of capitalist development have encouraged a reallocation of women’s time and effort away from un-paid care activities in families toward paid employment. The global 
fertility rate now hovers between two and three children per woman, and in many 
affluent countries, including the United States, has dropped below the population 
replacement level of about 2.1 children per woman.35 Rates of childlessness have 
also increased in the United States, particularly among highly educated women. 
On average, women have reduced the proportion of their life cycle they spend car-
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ing for young children, improving their access to labor market earnings and en-
hancing their ability to mobilize for institutional change. 
Economic changes on the demand side have also contributed to changes in 
women’s roles. In the United States as in other affluent countries, the growth of 
the service sector created new labor market opportunities rewarding brains more 
than brawn. Once considered relatively poor pickings compared with manufac-
turing jobs, service jobs are now considered less vulnerable to the ups and downs 
of the business cycle, and they are often difficult to outsource or move offshore. 
Some economists argue that women have interpersonal or “people skills” that 
will be richly rewarded by current labor market trends.36 
This optimistic outlook ignores some significant countervailing trends. The 
decline in children per woman in the United States has been accompanied by an 
increase in the economic costs that children impose on mothers, driven by new 
preoccupations with “child quality” and cultural pressure for “intensive mother-
ing” at the top end of the income distribution, and increases in the percentage 
of children supported by mothers alone at the low end. Further, women’s access 
to high-paying professional and managerial jobs has been restricted by high tem-
poral demands that such jobs impose: long work weeks, flexibility for late-night 
and weekend work, and availability for travel away from home. At the low end of 
the labor market, mothers face the opposite problem: part-time shift work and 
unpredictable hours often leave them with inadequate childcare and inadequate 
earnings. The growing demands of elder care exacerbate these pressures. 
Furthermore, employed women are highly concentrated in the care sector of 
the U.S. market economy, in health, education, and social service jobs that pay 
significantly less than jobs in private business services and public administration, 
controlling for educational credentials.37 While social skills relevant to manage-
ment and marketing pay off in the private sector, skills directed at caring or help-
ing people who lack much ability to pay are undervalued in the labor market. Be-
cause women in the United States are also disproportionately represented in pub-
lic sector jobs, budgetary austerity has affected them even more than men. 
Today, collective bargaining over the distribution of the costs of reproduc-
tion takes place largely within the arena of the welfare state. Women’s role in care 
provision generally makes them more appreciative of social spending than men 
and helps account for the growing gap in gender voting preferences in the United 
States. Women would be a more unified and powerful voting bloc were it not for 
the way other collective interests shape incentives to offload the costs of social re-
production. Here, other labyrinthine institutional structures come into play. 
Everyone belongs to more than one socially assigned group, and the paths available to them are shaped by many intersecting or overlapping collec-tive identities. The institutional organization of reproduction impinges on 
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all groups who hope to persist over time and has implications that reach far be-
yond interests based on gender, age, and sexuality. Modern welfare states have so-
cialized many of the costs of health, education, and insurance, and typically re-
strict access to such benefits through immigration controls. As a result, citizen-
ship in a country such as the United States is a marker of significant economic 
privilege. 
Perceived threats to the collective interests of groups based on citizenship and 
race and ethnicity are often related to social reproduction rather than more nar-
rowly defined economic interests. Congressman Steven King (R-Iowa) has com-
plained that “we can’t restore our civilization with other people’s babies” and “if 
we let our birthrate get below the replacement rate, we’re a dying civilization.”38 
Such complaints provide a rationale for denying women access to reproductive 
rights in the name of national and racial and ethnic interests: asking them to for-
go “selfish” decisions for the sake of Christian civilization. 
Class differences in access to care services are also consequential. Highly edu-
cated women living in metropolitan areas benefit economically from a large sup-
ply of low-wage immigrant women who provide childcare and elder care at a rel-
atively low cost; less-educated women can seldom afford care services that are 
not publicly provided. Many public universities in the Midwest, starved of state 
support, have increased admissions from overseas students who can pay full tu-
ition. For instance, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the num-
ber of Chinese students has increased by a factor of five since 2008.39 Such en-
rollments help subsidize the cost of educating state residents, but also reduce the 
spaces available to them. 
T he concept of patriarchal institutional structures offers a guide for trac-ing the effect of gender on the intersecting and overlapping paths creat-ed by multiple group interests. Rather than focusing on one overarching 
dimension of collective conflict, it emphasizes multiple, complex, and context- 
dependent interactions. It encourages more attention to institutional specifics–
and to the organization of reproduction and social reproduction–than conven-
tional economic frameworks. While it leaves room for individual agency, it also 
emphasizes the impact of the altruism and solidarity that can make groups effec-
tive economic actors. 
The stylized model of cooperative conflict between women and men draws 
from the rational-choice tradition of game theory but emphasizes the complex-
ity of a strategic environment that precludes any clear perception of payoffs. The 
insights that emerge from such models are best considered a guide for historical 
and comparative analysis, a spool of many different threads that can be used to ex-
plore possible escapes from the labyrinths of the past. 
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